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The Price of Dissent:
The Iowa Farmers Union and the
Early Cold War, 1945-1954
BRUCE FIELD
SINCE THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL and the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union, Americans have applauded the sup-
posed U.S. victory in the Cold War. The public has neglected
the Cold War's daniaging impact on U.S. society, however. For
example, citizens pay scant attention to the injustices of McCar-
thyism, a movement that historian Stanley Kutler dramatically
describes as the "American Inquisition."^ Yet it is important to
remember nation-shaping events such as the purge of the China
experts, the trial of Alger Hiss, and the exaggerations of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. While it did not
receive the exposure of these better-known events, the fate that
befell the Iowa Farmers Union and its president, Fred Stover,
between 1945 and 1954 illustrates the Cold War's effects on
Iowa's history.
The Iowa Farmers Union was one of fifteen affiliates of the
National Farmers Uruon (NFU), the nation's third-largest gen-
eral farm organization.^ After World War II, the five hundred
1. Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War
(New York, 1982).
2. After World War II, the American Farm Bureau Federation claimed the
largest national membership (1.5 million members), while the National Grange
served the interests of 800,000 farmers nationwide. The history of the Grange
and the Farm Bureau can be found in a variety of sources. See Lowell Dyson,
Farmers' Organizations (New York, 1986); Wesley McCune, Who's Behind Our
Farm Policy (New York, 1956); and Walter W. Wilcox, Sodal Responsibility in
THE ANNALS OF IOWA 55 (Winter 1996). ©The State Historical Society of
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thousand members of the NEU distinguished themselves from
other organized farmers by publicly criticizing President Tru-
man's foreign policy. Unlike members of the National Grange
and the American Earm Bureau Eederation, those in the National
Earmers Union rejected a single-minded focus on overseas mar-
kets; likewise, they rejected the notion that Commimism was
the major roadblock to American success. Led by national pres-
ident James G. Patton, the organization instead hoped that the
United States would take a "cooperative role in shaping the
future of the entire world." Speaking to the armual convention
of the South Dakota Earmers Union in the fall of 1945, Patton
argued that Americans needed to "learn to live in a peace based
on patience, tolerance, and understanding of the peoples who
do not speak our language, who do not use our form of gov-
emment, and whose concepts are predicated upon centuries of
economic, social, and political backgrounds widely different
from ours. Specifically," he continued, "we must learn to live
in this world with the great country of Russia. We simply must
come to understand how Russian people think, why they do
what they do, and then guide our foreign policy in terms of a
firm position but with determination to cooperate to live in
peace."^
Farm Leadership: An Analysis of Farm Problems and Farm Leadership in Action
(Westport, CT, 1975).
3. James G. Patton, "The Federal Government's Role in the Postwar Economy,"
American Political Science Review 38 (1944), 1126; National Union Farmer, 15
October 1945. No overall assessment of the National Grange's or American
Farm Bureau Federation's attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy has yet been
attempted, but those organizations' procontainment views are evident in a
number of readily available sources, including congressional hearings. See,
for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, European
Recovery Program: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong.,
2d sess. (1948); U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United
States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948); U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); and U.S. Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952). One can
also establish the procontairunent views of the National Grange and American
Farm Bureau Federation by examining State Department studies. See, for
example. Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Current
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The NFU, disappointed with U.S. policymakers' aggressive
stance, denoxmced the major tenets of the Truman admirüstra-
tion's policy of containment. It rejected continued development
of atomic weapons in favor of "complete disarmament, right
down to pistols." It judged Truman's $18 billion military budget
to be part of an unnecessary plan to "whale the tar out of some-
body pretty soon." In keeping with his view of the TrumariDoc- i/
trine as an example of "saber-rattling, oppressive irnperiaïîsîrî;^
_Tim Patton warned against the Marshall Plan. He noted that the \
"Ümfeä^tates could not "afford to take the position that we are
a big bad Santa Claus who is footing the bills and therefore is
going to be boss."*
The National Farmers Union's argument was as simple as
it was direct. The United States, it argued, had failed to live up
to its pronouncements of international cooperation. Instead, the
Urüted States had bypassed the newly created United Nations
to shape the world as it saw fit. The Truman admirüstration's
approach rejected the cooperative spirit exhibited by the Allies
during World War 11. Preoccupied with strategic and defense
concerns, it betrayed traditional American respect for national
self-determination by supporting undemocratic regimes. It also
contrived one crisis after another to justify American action in
the place of what it claimed to be an inadequately prepared
United Nations. The United States risked losing credibility with
or alienating many of the world's peoples if they followed the
Truman administration's scheme, according to the NFU. Further,
Attitudes of Farmer Organizations Toward International Relations, RG 59, National
Archives; Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Attitudes of
Farmer Organizations Toward International Issues, 1951-1952, RG 59, National
Archives; and Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Opinions
and Activities of American Private Organizations and Groups, RG 59, National
Archives. Finally, one can deduce National Grange and American Farm Bureau
Federation viewpoints by examining their organizational newspapers. The
Grange News and American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter.
4. "Statement of James G. Patton Before the Executive Committee of the
National Board of Directors, National Farmers Union, December 17, 1946,"
p. 3, box 2, Farmers Union of the New York Milk Shed Records, 1939-1957,
Cornell University Library; Iowa Union Farmer, 28 September 1946; National
Union Farmer, 1 April 1947; James G. Patton to Earl O. Shreve, 18 November
1947, box 1453, RG16, Secretary of Agriculture, General Correspondence
1906-1975, National Archives.
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its aggressive stance interfered with the re-establishment of eco-
nomic ties between western and eastern Europe. Finally, it
squandered American dollars on containment of a supposed
Commimist threat. This money might be better spent, the NFU
insisted, on domestic development, such as programs to assist
the nation's embattled family farmers.^
Between 1945 and 1949, the National Farmers Union op-
posed U.S. foreign policy persistently and intensely. Maintaining
its principled opposition to the Truman administration grew
more difficult, however, in the summer of 1950. On June 25,
1950, North Korean ti:oops crossed the 38th Parallel. The United
States and United Nations interpreted the action as Communist
aggression and sent troops to assist South Korea. Shortly after
the deployment of U.S. troops, Jim Patton assured President
Truman that the NFU supported his efforts in Korea. After con-
ferring with his executive committee, Patton issued an eight-
paragraph position statement on "the Present Crisis in Asia."
He reminded members that the organization had "openly crit-
icized" U.S. foreign policy in the past, but concluded that the
"evil" actions of the Soviet Union in "fomenting armed aggres-
sion" in Korea had made United States and United Nations ac-
tion necessary. Patton's appeal to his executive committee made
it clear why he favored such a policy reversal. "I believe," he
wrote, "that the primary function of the Farmers Union and its
officials is to preserve that Union. And I am sure that if our
Union is to be preserved and looked upon and heard as a re-
sponsible organization in the Urüted States, it is absolutely nec-
essary for us to support the Urüted Nations and to support our
Govemment which is now at war."*
5. The National Farmers Union also disagreed with the National Grange and
the American Farm Bureau Federation over other issues besides foreign policy,
most notably in its advocacy of an active governmental role in the economic
life of the nation. As the self-professed spokesgroup for the nation's "family
farmers," the NFU advocated direct govenunent support programs and
questioned the other two groups' emphasis on pure free enterprise capitalism.
6. Undated interoffice commimication of the National Farmers Uruon, sum-
marizing the 18 July 1950 meeting between Jim Patton and President Truman,
box 10, James G. Patton Papers, Westem Historical Collections, University of
Colorado Library; Policy Statement of James G. Patton, President, National
Farmers Union, 8 September 1950, series no. 5, box 4, National Farmers Union
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In the months that followed, Patton reiterated his new-found
support for U.S. foreign policy. Although he had vigorously pro-
tested an annual defense budget of $18 billion in 1946, by late
1950 he had changed his mind. "My own personal opinion," he
wrote in a letter to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, "is
that we should spend $50 billion a year for the next three years
on the defense effort just on the basis that we are going to pre-
sent a stronger armed position. If we must get ready for a major
war with Russia, then I think we should do our planning on the
basis of spending half of our national income for that effort."^
In October 1950 Patton told the South Dakota Farmers Union
that U.S. policymakers needed to realize "that aggression any-
where in this closely knit world is an eventual threat to our
security at home." By January 1951, Patton seemingly exceeded
the zeal of Truman administration policymakers, suggesting that
m^odified containment was inadequate and arguing for more
forceful steps.*
Several factors contributed to Patton's clear reversal of
policy, including the volatile state of postwar liberalism reflected
in Henry Wallace's disappointing presidential campaign in
1948.' More than an5^thing, however, Patton desired to "pre-
serve the [National Farmers] Union.. . as a responsible organi-
zation in the United States." To accomplish that goal, Patton had
to counter damaging charges of sjonpathy with, and even direct
Papers (hereafter cited as NFU Papers), Westem Historical CoUecdons,
University of Colorado Library; Minutes of the ExecuHve Committee of the
National Farmers Union, 25 July 1950, and Report of James G. Patton,
President, National Farmers Union, to the Executive Committee, 24-26 July
1950, Fred Stover Papers, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa
Libraries. (The Stover Papers are as yet unprocessed, and so more exact
citations in this and subsequent footnotes are not possible.).
7. Iowa Union Farmer, 28 September 1946; Patton to Symington, 21 September
1950, box 7, folder 9, Patton Papers.
8. James G. Patton, "Address to South Dakota Farmers Union Convention,"
5 October 1950, box 24, folder 6, Patton Papers; Patton to Symington, 22
January 1951, box 7, folder 26, Patton Papers.
9. See William C. Pratt, "The Farmers Union and the 1948 Henry Wallace
Campaign," Annals of Iowa 49 (1988), 349-70; see also idem, "Glenn J. Talbott,
the Farmers Union, and American Liberalism after World War II," North
Dakota History 55 (1988), 3-13.
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control by. Communist agents.^" Although the supporting evi-
dence consisted mostly of fabrication, Americans generally be-
lieved that the National Farmers Uruon was at least sjmipathetic
to Soviet aims, if not directly controlled by Moscow.
Some of the most vocal crifics of the NFU were members
of the National Farmers Union themselves." In 1946, for ex-
ample, Nebraska Farmers Uruon president Chris Milius accused
the national organization of being "Commimistic." Gardner
Jackson, who had served the Nafional Fanners Urüon in a vari-
ety of tmofficial capacifies since 1936, also accused the organiza-
fion and its leadership of being "bewitched by the siren song
of salvafion for humanity simg by the Commvinists." In 1947,
National Union Farmer editor James Elmore resigned over the
issue, accusing Patton and the Union's "confused left-wing
leadership" of "playing foofie" with the Commurüsts and of
following a "pro-communist coUaborafiorüst l i " * ^
10. Studies of the role of the Communist Party in American agriculture have
cautioned scholars not to overestimate the strength of the relationship between
farmers and Communist sympathizers. It is true, however, that the NFU's
outspoken criticism of U.S. policy convinced many contemporaries that the
group had succumbed to the intemal borings of Communist moles. See Lowell
Dyson, Red Harvest: The Communist Party and American Fanners (Lincoln, NE,
1982); William C. Pratt, "Farmers, Communists, and the FBI in the Upper
Midwest," Agricultural History 62 (1989), 61-80.
11. The National Farmers Urüon had a lengthy history of intemal squabbling
that dated to the founding of the orgarüzation in Texas in 1902. Early bickering
over the predominance of Texans in leadership roles was followed in sub-
sequent years by interne disputes over whether to expand political activity,
whether to allow nonfarmers to become members, and whether to support
the policies of the New Deal. The occasional intercity of these intemal debates
led Jim Patton to characterize one four-year period in the organization's
history as an "Irish Picnic" in which "everybody grabbed a shillala and hit
the first person he could see." Quoted in Charles H. Livermore, "James G.
Patton: Nineteenth-Century Populist, Twentieth-Century Organizer, Twenty-
First-Century Visionary" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Denver, 1976), 15. The
history of the National Farmers Union is treated at length in John A.
Crampton, The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure Group (Lincoln,
NE, 1965); and William P. Tucker, "Populism Up-to-Date: The Story of the
Farmers Union," Agricultural History 21 (1947), 198-208.
12. Patton to Members of Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of
America, Nebraska Division, 15 November 1946, Stover Papers; Jackson to
Patton, 3 August 1946, box 57, Gardner Jackson Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York; Elmore to Patton, 9 September 1947, box 35,
Price of Dissent 7
Patton responded to these charges by accusing Milius of
having a "narrow creviced mind" and by describing Jackson's
charges as "so preposterous as to warrant disregard."" His an-
ger stemmed both from the disloyalty of National Earmers
Urüon colleagues and from the unsubstantiated nature of their
charges. Patton found himself in a frustrating situation as the
charges of Communist sympathizing grew: how could the Earm-
ers Union, amidst the anti-Communist hysteria of the time,
simultaneously remain an organization of dissent and a key
player in the world of Washington politics?
In the 1930s and early 1940s, the National Earmers Union
had criticized an unholy alliance between business and govem-
ment, one that it believed contributed to the demise of the
nation's family farmers. Although critical of government-business
cooperation, the NEU had maintained a degree of respect and
influence in Washington; Patton and other National Earmers
Union officials frequently testified before congressional commit-
tees and served in a number of advisory positions." Criticism
of the nation's economic system was one thing, but criticism of
its foreign policy, particularly as Americans began dying in
Korea, was quite another. As charges of subversion mounted
in 1950, Jim Patton recognized that he and other organization
officials needed to mute their criticism of American foreign
policy or risk losing their irifluence in Washington. With this
in mind, Patton decided to reverse the MEU's longstanding
Aubrey Williams Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Elmore to Aubrey
Williams, 9 September 1947, box 35, Williams Papers; J. A. Spengler to Mrs.
Frank P. Leo, 28 March 1956, series no. 14, box 2, NFU Papers.
13. Patton to Members of Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of
America, Nebraska Division, 15 November 1946, Stover Papers; Patton to
Jackson, 14 November 1946, box 57, Jackson Papers.
14. Biographical information on Jim Patton's early career can be found in
Charles Livermore's dissertation and Crampton's Ideology of a Pressure Group,
115-20. See also Dyson, Red Harvest, 189-92; Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New
Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), 149-50;
Dyson, Farmers' Organizations, 224-27; Carey Longmire, "Colorado Cyclone,"
unpublished paper, 13 March 1946, box 27, folder 17, Patton Papers; and
Steven A. Chambers, "Relations Between Leaders of the Iowa and National
Farmers Union Organizations, 1941 to 1950" (honors thesis, Iowa State Univer-
sity, 1961), 15-24.
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opposition to U.S. foreign policy by supporting American ia-
volvement in Korea. Most National Farmers Union officials
moved along with Patton, either softening their criticisms of U.S.
foreign policy or wholeheartedly supporting the war in Korea.
A few, most notably Iowa Farmers Union president Fred Stover,
refused to do so.
STOVER HAD MATCHED Jim Patton's fervor and had de-
nounced the Truman administration's foreign policy since as-
. suming the presidency of the Iowa Farmers Union in 1945. In
v ^ an April 1947 editorial in thejowa Union Farmer titled "Imperial-
ism at its Worst," Stover assailed President Truman. He charged
t / that Truman had betrayed Jeffersonian revolutionary ideology
through his support of "tottering monarchies" and "forces of
oppression" in Greece and Turkey. After the 1948 elections.
Stover argued eloquently against the nation's "reactionary mil-
itaristic foreign policy," decrying the effort to have "both gvms
and butter." As 1949 dawned. Stover bitterly desaibed the newly
armounced North Atlantic alliance as a "North Atlantic Decep-
tion" that "mortgage[d] our lives to war."'^ Stover's condemna-
tion of President Truman's policies and his involvement in a
number of international peace organizations made him the most
/ visible National Farmers Uruon official at the state level, with
\/ the possible exception of North Dakota president Glenn Talbott.
In 1950 these activities also made him the subject of FBI anä"'
State Department investigations. Finally, his imwillingness to
bridle his criticism of U.S. foreign policy made him a likely
target for an NFU purge sponsored by Jim Patton.^*
Jim Patton had acted on his uneasiness about the future of
the National Farmers Union even prior to the Korean War. In
late 1949 and early 1950 he had orchestrated the removal of
Denver headquarters worker Lee Fiyer, organization legal coun-
15. Icma Union Farmer, 19 April 1947, 20 November 1948,19 March 1947,16
April 1949; National Union Farmer, January 1949.
16. FBI reports, 24 January 1956 and 18 August 1956, box 48, Iowa Farmers
Union Records, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library; Canberra
to State Department, 19 May 1950,743.001/5-1950, box 3560, RG 59, National
Archives.
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sel Cliff Purr, and Minnesota state president_Einer Kuivinen. \ / v/
Stover believed that his highly publicized rejection of Truman's
policies placed Iowa "next on the purge list." However, Stover
remained naively optimistic that NFU members would prevent
the organization from openly supporting the Truman adminis-
tration.^In a letter to Northeastern Division president Archie "7
Wrightj^Stover concluded that Patton would probably try to
curry political favors and "water down our foreign policy posi-
tion by ambiguous language and doubletalk," but he "wouldn't
dare" call for a total reversal of "our good position on foreign
!'
Stover's optimisnt ended when the Korean War began.
Unlike Patton, who accepted the legality of Truman's actions.
Stover charged President Truman with ordering troops into
Korea prior to official United Nations action.'^ In editorials and
at Farmers Union meetings in Iowa and elsewhere. Stover chal-
lenged the goverrvment's explanation of events in Korea. Iowa
Farmers Union members supported their leader's challenge and,
at their annual conventions in 1950 and 1951, called for an end
to the war. The State Department responded to Iowa Farmers
Union charges, especially those in a December 1951 piece titled
"Debunking the Lies About Korea," by issuing a lengthy restate-
ment of United States' rationales for military involvement in
Korea.!'
Drawing the attention of the State Department was pre-
cisely what Jim Patton had hoped to avoid. So, as Stover and
the Iowa Farmers Union persistently denounced American ef-
forts in Korea, Patton decided to cut them loose from the
17. Fryer to Stover, 15 November 1949, Stover Papers; Minutes of the Alabama
Farmers Uruon Board of Directors meeting at Montgomery, 12 April 1951, box
33, Williams Papers; Einer Kuivinen, "Peace is Paramount," undated leaflet
published by The Committee for a Progressive State Legislature, Stover Papers;
Stover to Wright, 21 December 1949 and 20 May 1950, Stover Papers.
18. Stover's sequencing of events mirrors the narrative of I. F. Stone's The
Hidden History of the Korean War (New York, 1952).
19. "Convention Resolutions of the 34th Annual Convention of the Farmers
Educational and Cooperative Union of America," Stover Papers; Iowa Union
Farmer, October 1951, December 1951; John M. Patterson to Jim Youngdale,
28 February 1952, 795.00/1-1052, RG 59, National Archives.
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National Farmers Union. To do so, he used tactics, including
contrivance and misrepresentations of fact, that mirrored those
used by anti-Communist critics of the Farmers Union.
FATTON MADE HIS FIRST MOVE at the Iowa Farmers
Union annual convention in Des Moines in September 1950.
Although he was xmable to attend the meeting, he sent an
address that included a clear ultimatum. "The power to revoke
. . . state charters," Fatton wrote, "is held by the National Farmers
Union, to be exercised . . . in the case of intolerable departures
from the democratically-adopted policies of a majority in conven-
tion." Fatton also released a statement to the Des Moines Register,
a newspaper that had opposed Stover for years and that had
characterized the Iowa Farmers Union as "a tiny fringe of little
consequence." In his statement to the newspaper, Patton an-
nounced that he was "totally in disagreement with Fred Stover's
present position on international policy" and that he felt "certain
that the members of the Iowa Farmers Union, too, almost to a
man, disagree with him."^°
Fatton's message was clear. Stover was the problem, and
the Iowa Farmers Union could retain its charter if the members
removed Stover as president. Otherwise, it faced loss of affilia-
tion with the national organization. Fatton, however, was wrong
about Iowa Farmers Union members. Not only was Stover
reelected president, but the Iow a^ Farmers Union also called
for "a settlement of the present war in Korea" that accorded
with Stover's views.^^
Having failed to unseat Stover by appealing to the state
membership, Fatton adopted a new strategy. With the help of
a small dissident group of Iowa Farmers Union mem^bers, Fatton
tried to prove that Stover should be removed as president of
the Iowa Farmers Union. He claimed that Stover had violated
the national orgarüzation's constitutional mandate against non-
20. James G. Patton, "To the Delegates and Members of the Iowa Farmers
Union in Convention at Des Moines, Iowa," 19 September 1950, Stover Papers;
Des Moines Register, 9 and 22 September 1950.
21. Convention Resolutions of the 34th Annual Convention of the Farmers
Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Stover Papers.
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partisan activity when he served as cochairman of the Progres-
sive Party. Patton directed the question to Washington, D.C.
attorney Carl Berueffy, who returned the legeil opinion that
Stover should have resigned as Iowa Farmers Union president
before accepting the position in the Progressive Party. According
to Berueffy, Stover was no longer legally state president and
should relinquish his office to vice-president Leonard Hoffman,
the leader of anti-Stover forces in Iowa.^
The argument was clearly a contrived effort to eliminate
Stover. The timing of Berueffy's response (less than one week
after the Iowa convention ended) strongly suggests that Hoff-
man or Patton, or both, had concocted Ö\e scheme in advance.
Patton's decision to consult Berueffy, someone unaffiliated with
the Union, could be considered an extraordinary attempt at!
impartiality. In consulting one outside authority, however,
Patton also avoided the lengthy battle that might have ensued
had he either consulted a number of impartial outsiders or re-
ferred the question to the NFU's executive committee, board of
directors, or entire membership. By relying on the advice of one
attorney, Patton got what he wanted—a quick solution to a
sticky problem. He also managed to avoid any discussion of
inconvenient facts. Stover had, by this time, resigned his posi-
tion in the Progressive Party. Moreover, Patton had also served
as vice-chairman of the National Citizen's Political Action Com-
mittee. In 1944, he had successfully defended his right to hold
the national presidency when critics charged that he had violated
the NFU's rules against partisan activity. Although Patton had
opposed this ploy when used against him, he fully supported it
when used against Stover. Patton's attempt failed, however. In
April, 1951 the Iowa courts declared that Fred Stover was the
legitimate president of the Iowa Fanners Union.^
22. Report of James G. Patton to the Executive Committee, 31 October 1950,
series no. 1, box 4, NFU Papers; Berueffy to Patton, 29 September 1950, series
no. 7, box 2, NFU Papers.
23. Chambers, "Relations Between Leaders," 30. See also Fred Stover's closing
speech to the September 1951 Iowa Farmers Union annual convention, box
6, U.S. Farmers Association Records, Special Collections Department, Univer-
sity of Iowa Libraries.
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TWICE DEEEATED in his attempts to remove Stover, Jim
Patton wrote Wisconsin Earmers Union president Ken Hones
that the national board of directors would "have to take specific
action in relation to Iowa." He could not isolate Stover from
the Iowa Earmers Union, but he could try to isolate the Iowa
Earmers Union from the rest of the NEU by revoking its charter.
Of course, Patton and the national leadership had no intention
of permanently banning Iowa farmers from membership. After
cancelling the charter of the Stover-led Iowa Earmers Union,
they planned to revive the state group under more cooperative
leadership.^*
Some Iowartô favored this approach. Dwight Anderson, who
had unsuccessfully challenged Stover for the Iowa Earmers
Union presidency in 1948, asked the national organization to
"revoke or suspend the charter of the Iowa Earmers Union as
soon as possible, and then come in and set up a new organiza-
tion."^ North Dakota president Glenn Talbott, Patton's closest
ally in the attempt to unseat Stover, candidly admitted that
neither the NEU nor its supporters in Iowa had any "sound,
legal grounds for revocation or cancellation of the Iowa Earmers
Urüon Charter."^* Still, Patton forces used the organization's
historic fiftieth anrüversary convention in 1952 as the spring-
board for the strategy.
Patton and Talbott arrived at the Dallas convention deter-
mined to eliminate the aruioying elements that the national
president now derisively described as the NEU's "tadpoles."^^
Working closely with other national figures, Patton designed
a constitutional amendment that would increase affiliates' min-
imum membership requirement from 1,000 to 3,500. Organi-
24. Patton to Hones, 25 May 1951, box 53, Wisconsin Farmers Union Papers,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
25. Anderson to Patton, 2 July 1951, box 9, Talbott Family Papers, Special
Collections, University of North Dakota Library.
26. Talbott to Leo Paulson, 18 October 1951, box 9, Talbott Family Papers.
27. In a letter to Montana's Oscar Horsford, Patton wrote that Harold
Ridenour, Fred Stover, and the editors of Facts for Farmers made him "feel like
the man who said, 'I would not mind being swallowed by a whale, but I'll
be damned if I intend to be irritated to death by tadpoles.'" Patton to
Horsford, 28 March 1952, box 10, folder 5, Talbott Family Papers.
Price of Dissent 13
zations failing to meet the minimum membership by the end
of 1953 faced charter revocation.^^ The amendment jeopardized
five affiliates: Oregon (which had a paid membership of 3,407),
Michigan (2,919), Texas (2,634), Iowa (2,296), and the Eastern
Division (3,213).^' As was evident from both preconvention
planning and subsequent actions, however, the change was
aimed exclusively at Iowa and the Eastern Division, the two
regional affiliates that continued to criticize U.S. foreign policy.
In the weeks leading up to the convention, Patton loyalists
laboriously drafted and redrafted the rationale for the constitu-
tional change. At one point, the writers toyed with directly cen-
suring Fred Stover. In the end, however, they decided upon an
executive committee "Statement and Recommendation" that
refrained from citing specific individuals yet clearly was directed
at the two organizational affiliates who most vocally opposed
the NFU's recent endorsement of President Truman's foreign
policy.^"
The statement "upheld the right of the individual to his
views and of a minority to be heard and to have its views
considered." But, it continued, "Liberty is not license and the
improper and dangerous actions and methods of a relatively
small minority within the organization may no longer be ig-
nored." Specifically, the statement claimed that a "small group"
of NFU members had parficipated in a series of "wrongful and
dangerous acts." These wrongdoers had, like dictators, attempt-
ed "to control, divide, confuse, [and] conquer." They had dis-
tributed publications "financed by unknown sources" that were
"deliberately misleading." When NFU officials attempted to
contact members and ex-members who disagreed with these
unnamed men, they had held "their own state boundaries to
28. "The Proposed Amendments to the Cor\stitution and By-Laws of the
National Farmers Union: An Analysis of Their Meaning and Effect," series
no. 5, box 4, book 1 (Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennial Convention,
Dallas, Texas, March 10-14), NFU Papers.
29. "Delegates Certified to Golden Jubilee 1952 National Convention," series
no. 5, box 4, folder 1, Minutes and Proceedings, Convention, 1952, NFU
Papers.
30. Handwritten and typed drafts and redrafts and related correspondence
can be found in box 9, folder 44, Talbott Fannily Papers.
14 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
be inviolable." Finally, they had used educational funds "in
violation of the rights of... other states and of National Farm-
ers Union."'^ In concise form, the executive committee's state-
ment reviewed the charges that had been levelled against the
Iowa Farmers Union since the start of the Korean War. It is
imdear, however, whether the executive committee's statement
was ever presented to the convention or whether it merely
existed as a justification should the need have arisen.
The organizational structure of the Dallas convention pre-
cluded the possibility of meaningful discussion of the issues.
Convention delegates' votes were weighted, each vote given
more or less weight depending on the membership strength
of the affiliate they represented. It was possible, therefore, for
Glerm Talbott's North Dakota delegation, which represented
over one-fourth of the national membership, to dominate de-
cisions with the support of just a few other affiliates. The
Talbott-Patton forces knew that they could attain their objec-
tive even without debate and so sat mute as the proposed
constitutional amendment was introduced.
Simeon Martin, from the threatened Michigan affiliate, was
the Hrst of many speakers who opposed the change. He re-
minded delegates how difficult it was to organize in regions
that were "sewed up tight with the reactionary Farm Bureau."
Fred Stover reiterated Martin's observation, adding that the
constitutional change represented an alarming denunciation
of "the very things we stand for." Eastern Division executive
secretary Louis Slocum followed, claiming that it was foolish
to adopt a proposal that made the orgarüzation neither bigger
nor more powerful. After further comments from Stover, a
Washington state delegate argued that he would be imable to
face the membership in his state if the amendment passed.
Oklahoma's Roscoe Beale, who felt that the change placed un-
necessary hardships on smaller states, pleaded for rejection of
the amendment.
Prior to the vote, not one delegate spoke in support of the
proposed change. Yet when it came time to vote, the measure
31. "Statement and Recommendation," February 1952, box 9, folder 44, Talbott
Family Papers.
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passed overwhelmingly. The threatened affiliates in Oregon,
Michigan, Iowa, and the Eastern Division opposed the amend-
ment, as did Minnesota and some dissenting individuals in
Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. Their combined vote, how-
ever, was overpowered by individual votes from Kansas, Neb-
raska, and Oklahoma, and block votes from Arkansas, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, the Rocky Mountain
Division, and, surprisingly, the threatened state of Texas. After
the balloting, a South Dakota delegate who favored the action
naively claimed that no affiliate would actually face charter rev-
ocation. Iowa's Merle Hansen, a close friend of Fred Stover,
offered a more realistic assessment when he described the con-
vention action as being driven by "the substance of hysteria."
Hansen predicted that the delegates had just authored "the ar-
ticles of suicide" for the National Farmers ^^
THE SILENCE of the Fatton-Talbott contingent gave the Dal-
las convention a conspiratorial air. Their substantial planning
had paid off, but they might have been overprepared.^^ They
held enough votes to quash dissent and manned the key po-
sitions in the parliamentary regulation of the proceedings.
Fatton's supporters merely had to show up, cast their votes, and
quietly listen to, or perhaps ignore, their opponents' futile ob-
jections. Constitutional amendments that tightened the control-
ling grip of the national leadership were passed in the same
fashion as the membership requirement amendment—without
one word of support. Elections were managed in a similar fash-
ion. For example, national vice-presidential candidate Marie
Holte gave a ten-minute election speech while her opponent,
incumbent Herb Rolph, declined to speak. Holte, who had intro-
duced a peace resolution at the November 1951 North Dakota
32. Transcript of convention debate, pp. 164-91, series no. 5, box 4, book 2
(Master Proceedings File), NFU Papers.
33. In addition to the extensive preconvention work on the executive com-
mittee's "Statement and Reconunendation," the national leadership arrived
in Dallas with a "file of letters" from Iowa's pro-Hoffman forces that they
suspected would be "extremely helpful" in obtaining converts. Glenn J. Talbott
to James G. Patton, 26 February 1952, box 10, folder 3, Talbott Family Papers.
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Fanners Union convention, was resoundingly defeated. Peace
resolutions also got the silent treatment. When Simeon Martin
called for the renunciation of colonialism and the withdrawal
of U.S. armed forces "from foreign soil," committee members
listened "in silence," gave his resolution scant consideration, and
then declined to present it to the convention for discussion.^*
Despite the Dallas Morning News's banner headline announc-
ing "Farmers Union Defeats Issue on Cease-Fire," there was no
"bitter floor fight" over the Korean War. Actually, the carefully
orchestrated convention muzzled Fred Stover's supporters and
their efforts to debate foreign policy. A Rank and File Commit-
tee circulated a "Statement of Principles" that objected to "some
Farmers Union leaders' endorsement of the gigantic . . . war
mobilization program. . . . " Those leaders, the committee ar-
gued, had "capitulated to the fantastic and fatal delusion that
farm prosperity can be attained through a gigantic warspending
program" and had accepted "the fiction that the present foreign
policy is the road to peace and prosperity." Dismissing Soviet
imperialism from the program committee's list of "major threats
to true world brotherhood and peace," the Rank and File Com-
mittee asked the convention to recognize only one significant
danger: "the existence in the world of uncorrected and indefen-
sible evils that provided the seed bed for agitafion, uprising, and
revolt." In calling for U.S. withdrawal from Korea, the commit-
tee noted that events in that nation had been produced by "star-
vation, exploitation, feudalism, [and] dictatorships," not the
determination of the Soviet Union "to exploit every wrong for
her own imperialistic purposes," as the NFU's proposed policy
statement suggested. Finally, the committee called for an Amer-
ican agenda that rejected the "threat of polifical and economic
penetration" as an instrument of foreign policy. These strongly
worded denunciations of U.S. policy, which at previous NFU
convenfions had echoed through every address, now were heard
only in hallways and hotel rooms. Besides Marie Holte's ref-
erences to "farm boys . . . in some far off place shooting people
34. Transcript of convention debate, pp. 70-71,164-91, series no. 5, box 4, book
2 (Master Proceedings File), NFU Papers; Iowa Union Farmer, November 1951,
April 1952.
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and being shot for something they know not what," the only
speech that even remotely suggested criticism of American pol-
icy was made by Scotland's Lord Boyd Orr, the former head of
the U.N.'s Eood and Agriculture Organization.^^
Facts for Farmers reported a more accurate version of events
when it declared that the top officers of the National Earmers
Urüon had struck "a heavy pro-Truman note" at Dallas.^* Jim
Patton, reversing his earlier criticisms of American vmilateralism,
argued that events in Korea had left the United States "no
choice but to maintain a protective shield of military strength
to protect free nations against possible military aggression by
would-be totalitarian world rulers." Secretary of Agriculture
Charles Brannan, invited by Patton to address the convention,
spoke in similar terms. The Urüted States, Brannan said, was
"willing to spend billions on defense—because we clearly
must." Brannan concluded, "[W]e cannot afford to allow a
billion people to fall under the domination of the Kremlin if aid
from us will prevent it." All that was needed to make the pro-
Truman celebration complete was President Truman himself,
but Truman declined Patton's invitation. When he sent his
regrets, however, Truman praised the National Earmers Union
and expressed his belief that the organization would "continue
to support a strong, forward-looking foreign policy. "^ ^
35. Dallas Morning News, 15 and 11 March 1952; Farmers Union National Rank
and File Committee, "Statement of Principles" and "To All Delegates and
Members," series no. 5, box 4, folder 1, Minutes and Proceedings, Convention
1952, NFU Papers; "Program Committee Policy Statement," series no. 5, box
4, book 1 (Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennial Convention, Dallas,
Texas, March 10-14), NFU Papers. Lord Boyd Orr merely observed that there
was "a mass uprising against imperialism of the white man in the Far East."
Transcript of convention debate, pp. 70-71, series no. 5, box 4, book 2 (Master
Proceedings File), NFU Papers.
36. Facts for Farmers was a monthly publication of Farm Research, Inc., a New
York-based organization. See Lowell Dyson, "Radical Farm Organizations and
Periodicals in America, 1920-1960," Agricultural History 45 (1971), 111-20.
37. Facts for Farmers, April 1952; Dallas Morning News, 13 March 1952; "Report
of James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union, 1952 Convention, Dallas,
Texas, March 10, 1952," and Truman to Patton, 8 March 1952, box 17, folder
titled National Farmers Union, Dallas Conference 3/52, Herbert J. Waters Papers,
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
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In 1952, nobody could predict how long the National Farm-
ers Urúon would pursue its new-found support for Truman's
policies. What was obvious, however, was that the organization
had altered its political orientation. The NFU had done more
than accept a more aggressive Americein role in world affairs.
At Dallas, it had also compromised a number of other views
that had defined the orgariization. It now encouraged private
enterprise and opposed "governmental agricultural collectives."
It cautiously avoided condemning Farm Bureau proposals to
move poorer farmers off the land; it also avoided recommending
an accelerated price support program for agriculture. As the
Rank and File Committee observed, these positions were a com-
plete violation of the tradifions of the NFU. "Never before," the
committee charged, "has the National Farmers Uruon identified
itself with exploiting business interests, placed limitations on
the cooperative movement, [or] advocated a program of scar-
city."^* Not only had it relinquished its role as foreign policy
critic, but it also had abandoned the premise that American
unilateralism damaged the domestic welfare of the nation's
farmers. Discarding their old articles of faith, the leaders of the
NFU adopted new policy positions that supported American
strength abroad, minimized direct government assistance to
farmers, and, reflecting the insecure temper of the times,
allowed no room for organizational dissent.
After the convention, Jim Patton remarked that opponents
of the organization's new direction had put on a "very shady
and shabby performance."^' The truth was, however, that the
national president and his backers were the ones guilty of un-
derhanded tactics, particularly in the orchestration of constitu-
tional restructuring to purge Fred Stover and other "heretics"
from the NFU. As the new 3,500-person minimum membership
requirement took effect in 1953, it became obvious that the re-
structuring had been instituted for no other reason than to
remove Cold War critics from the organization.
38. "Program Committee Policy Statement," series no. 5, box 4, book 1 (Exhibit
File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biermial Convention, Dallas, Texas, March 10-14),
NFU Papers; Farmers Union National Rank and File Committee, "To All
Delegates and Members," series no. 5, box 4, folder 1, NFU Papers.
39. Patton to Aubrey Williams, 20 April 1952, box 7, folder 16, Patton Papers.
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THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION'S internal divisions
hurt membership drives in each of the five states potentially
targeted by the new charter revocation clause. Perhaps because
the quarrel had taken place in its own backyard, the Texas af-
filiate was the most severely damaged. By 1953, its membership
had dropped 59 percent, from 2,634 to 1,069. Iowa's membership (•—x
dropped by 43 percent, from 2,296 to 1,311. A part of this de- V - ^ ^
cline in Iowa may have been due to the controversial position V^
of the Iowa Farmers Union, but Iowa membership also fell be-
cause anti-Stover forces urged members to boycott the affiliate.
Michigan lost 32 percent of its membership, the Eastem Division
lost 28 percent, and Oregon lost 20 percent of its members.*"
Despite the decline in er\rollment, each of the five affiliates still
met the one-thousand-member minimum originally prescribed
by the National Farmers Union constitution. The Dallas revision,
however, had made each a potential victim.
When the national board of directors met in Denver on
March 13,1954, it considered an executive committee report that
detailed the membership situations of the five affiliates aiid rec-
ommended appropriate action. This was a remarkable docu-
ment, not only because of its obvious bias against Iowa and the
Eastem Division, but also because of the rationalizations it con-
tained. These justifications reveal much about the true motiva-
tions of the National Farmers Union.
Texas, the state that had lost the greatest percentage of mem-
bers between 1952 and 1953, now had the lowest membership
total of any of the orgarüzation's fifteen affiliates. The executive
committee reminded the board of directors, however, that Texas
was "the original home of the Farmers Union" and its affiliate
was directed by officers who were "capable, conscientious and
hard working." In addition, the Texas affiliate's insurance pro-
gram was "soundly developing and expanding." For these rea-
40. Membership decreased as follows: Michigan (2,919 to 1,980); Eastem Di-
vision (3,213 to 2,329); and Oregon (3,407 to 2,711). For a recapitulation and
analysis of membership declines among threatened affiliates, see "A Report
of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of Farmers Educational
and Cooperative Union of America to the Full Board Regarding the Future
Status of Those State Organizations of the Farmers Union Which Had Failed
to Reach a Membership of 3500 by the End of the 1953 Fiscal Year," series no.
14, box 2, folder 1, NFU Papers.
20 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
sons, the executive committee recommended leaving Texas's
charter status "imdisturbed."*'
The executive committee also recommended sustaining
Oregon's charter, in part because of its thriving insurance pro-
gram. While the official state membership was 2,711, Oregon
could claim more than three thousand National Farmers Union
automobile insurance policyholders. The newly elected state pres-
ident had promised to develop this potential membership pool,
and so the executive committee believed that the "activities and
energies" of the Oregon affiliate could be "properly marshalled
and guided.""'
Finally, the executive committee recommended that the
Michigan Farmers Union be allowed to retain its charter, al-
though its reasons for making this recommendation were un-
clear. The committee report vaguely referred to "existing
obstacles" that had been surmounted, the recent improvement
in the "public atfitude toward [the] Farmers Union," and "sev-
eral organizafional changes" that had "already borne consider-
able fruit." The report concluded that there were "few, if any
[negafive factors] with respect to our future in this state."*^
The executive committee was not so optimistic about the
Eastern Division. Dredging up a new rationale for charter rev-
ocafion, the report described "a material dissimilarity" in the
populations of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the two states
constitufing the Eastern Division. The executive committee
argued that it might have been a mistake to have ever com-
bined the two into one unit. Since "conscientious officers have
failed to achieve a coordinated effort" between the two states,
and since farmers in Fennsylvania had declined "for reasons
of their own . . . to join or parficipate as long as the present
charter situafion prevails," the executive committee report sug-
gested revoking the charter of the Eastem Division and then
pursuing an "independent charter status" for Fennsylvania.
The report warned that "further study and discussion" would
be necessary before opening an aggressive membership cam-
41. Ibid., 1-2.
42. Ibid., 2.
43. Ibid., 2.
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paign in New Jersey.^ The committee's recommendation de-
liberately avoided any mention of foreign policy disputes
between the state and national leaderships. It also failed to men-
tion that Alvin Christman and Louis Slocum, the two vocal
critics of U.S. foreign policy who headed the Eastem Division,
managed the affiliate from their offices in New Jersey.
The executive committee recommended revoking Iowa's
charter as well. It praised the strength of the affiliate in the early
history of the NFU, but noted that farmers in Iowa, "for what-
ever reasons they may have . . . will not join [the] Farmers
Union in that state as it is presently constituted." The "continu-
ing deterioration in the effectiveness" of the state organization
Stood in stark contrast to the "abxmdant evidence that a new
and fresh organizational start in Iowa would receive wide and
effective farmer support."*^ Again, the recommendation never
referred to foreign policy differences, presenting the case for
charter revocation instead as a remedy to organizational in-
effectiveness.
Not surprisingly, the national board of directors adopted
the recommendations of the executive committee and revoked
the charters of Iowa and the Eastem Division on March 13.
Three days before the final decision was made, Fred Stover was
summoned to Chicago to meet with NFU representatives Gus
Geisler and Charles Brarman. The purpose of the meeting.
Stover later reported, was to give the Iowa leader a last chance
to save the state's charter. If he agreed to step down as presi-
dent and allow the NFU to handpick a new leader "who never
had any cormections or associations with the Iowa Farmers
Union," Geisler and Brannan argued that Stover could save
embarrassment for himself personally, for his state member-
ship, and for the NFU as a whole.**
Stover declined their offer and instead issued a "fact sheet"
summarizing the events leading up to charter revocation. Stover,
44. Ibid., 2-3.
45. Ibid., 3.
46. "Fact Sheet: Statement by the Iowa Farmers Union," Stover Papers. Gus
Geisler was an organizer for the National Farmers Union. Charles Brannan
had been President Truman's Secretary of Agriculture, but became an NFU
adviser thereafter.
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along with Alvin Christman, also published a statement de-
scribing the NEU action as "a shortsighted decision" that would
"comfort orüy our enemies." Unlike the national leadership, who
remained purposely vague about the decision. Stover, Christ-
man, and Iowa member Lee Harthan developed thorough sum-
maries that questioned the wisdom of reducing the organiza-
tion's membership at a time when "join[ing] together for mutual
protection" seemed to be the more logical goal. Harthan urged
Patton to seize the opporturüty "to heal all the sores that exist
in the Union."*'
The time for healing, however, had passed, at least in the
mind of Jim Patton. As the Korean War ended, the NEU pres-
ident covüd take comfort that his purge had at last succeeded.
Unfortvmately, however, this purge did little to diminish the
public's negative impressions of the National Earmers Union.
Despite the NEU's support for U.S. policy in Korea, New Hamp-
shire Senator Styles Bridges assailed the organization on the
floor of the U.S. Senate. In a two-hour address. Bridges de-
scribed the Commurüsts' "considerable, if not complete, success"
in infiltrating the NEU. The NEU was also the subject of anti-
Commurüst attacks orchestrated by the Utah division of the
American Earm Bureau. In a pamphlet titled How You Can Fight
Communism, a Texas American Legion post charged Communist
subversion within the NEU. In 1951 the House Un-American
Activities Committee initiated investigations of the NEU during
hearings on "communist activities among farm groups." The
public's unchanged perception is reflected in the astonished state-
ment of a Permsylvarüa woman who learned that the courts had
ruled in favor of the National Earmers Urüon in a 1953 libel
case. "What was wrong with the courts?" she wanted to know.
"Was it not well established that the Earmers Urüon was Com-
munist-infütrated?"**
47. "Fact Sheet," Stover Papers; "Statement of Iowa Farmers Union and Eastem
Division of the National Farmers Union," 16 March 1954, Stover Papers;
Harthan to Patton, 10 March 1954, series no. 14, box 2, folder 1, NFU Papers.
48. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 7 September 1950,14276-14296;
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Utah State Farm Bureau Fed-
eration et al vs National Fanners Union" Service Corporation et al, 11 June 1952,
box 17, Waters Papers; National Union Fariner, May 1951; U.S. Congress, House,
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BETWEEN THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR and his
death in 1985, Jim Patton rarely spoke about the purge. When
he did, he insisted that the NFU's actions against Stover and the
Iowa Farmers Union had nothing to do with differences of opin-
ion over Korea in particular or over American foreign policy in
general. Instead, Patton claimed, the fight against Stover and
the Iowa Farmers Union had been necessary because of the Iowa
leader's inability to build membership in his state. He character-
ized Stover not as a subversive, nor as a Communist, but as a
"total non-conformist" who was "so cantankerous" and "so god-
damn crazy" that he had to be removed for the sake of organi-
zational unity.*'
Although National Farmers Union officials still defend this
argument, the facts tell another story. Fred Stover was not re-
moved from the National Farmers Union for membership de-
ficiencies, nor for organizafional ineffectiveness. He and the
other members of the Iowa Farmers Union were purged because
they challenged President Truman's foreign policy. Rumors that
their challenge was Commimist-inspired represented a threat
to the continued existence and effectiveness of the National
Farmers Union, an organization that Jim Patton sought to
preserve at all cost. In the dark days of the early Cold War,
maintaining principles opposed to mainstream thought was a
dangerous proposition. Fred Stover and the Iowa Farmers Union
stood firm against containment and, in so doing, paid the price
of dissent in an era of national hysteria.
Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regarding Communist Activities
Among Farm Groups: Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities
82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); Information from the Files of the Committee on
Un-American Activities, 1 April 1957, pp. 1-2, series no. 14, box 2, NFU
Papers; Irene B. Startford to Ezra Benson, 15 April 1953, box 2320, folder titled
Publicatior\s 4-2, RG 16, National Archives.
49. Charles Livermore, Transcript of Columbia oral history interview with Jim
Patton, August 1978, pp. 93-96, box 1, Patton Papers.
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